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Introduction 
Major shareholders play an important role in corporate governance (CG). According to the 
agency theory, ownership concentration is a control mechanism that is used to solve agency 
problems by aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. Theoretically, with an 
increase in ownership concentration, monitoring is expected to become more effective; major 
shareholders have the incentive and ability to monitor management and mitigate agency 
conflict. Furthermore, the large holdings of major shareholders are expected to alleviate the 
free-rider problem related to the dispersion of ownership and control (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986).  Through their large stake in the company, it is cost-effective for major shareholders to 
monitor management; return would be sufficient to cover their monitoring costs (Conyon and 
Florou, 2002). Therefore, the presence of major shareholders and the size of their holdings is 
a common explanatory variable in CG research.  
Prior literature has paid considerable attention to the effect of major shareholders, specifically 
institutional investors, on firm value and other performance measures (see for example; 
Nguyen et al., 2013, Thomsen et al., 2006). Institutional investors can persuade firms to 
implement good CG, either using their voting rights or by voting with their feet (Aggarwal et 
al., 2010).  Institutional shareholders such as mutual and pension funds are well established 
as important players in the majority of financial markets, and they are the largest shareholders 
of most publicly traded firms in Western countries.  Institutional investors control 
approximately 60 per cent of the outstanding shares of common stocks in the United States 
(Hayashi, 2003) and approximately 70% of the UK equity market4 in 2012.
                                                            
4
  Major shareholders include unit trust 9.6%, insurance companies 6.2% and pension funds 4.7% (ONS, 2012). 
 
Page 2 of 52
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jaaf
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 3
.
 
     Similarly, many studies have explored the investment preferences of institutional 
investors. Starks (2009) found that institutional investors are particularly interested in a 
firm’s CG. In addition, a study by McKinsey and Company (2002) which covered 31 
different countries revealed that institutional investors considered CG to be as important a 
factor as other financial indicators in their investment decisions which was revalidated by 
McCahery et al. (2010). However, to the best of our knowledge, no previous research has 
examined the preferences of major (non-institutional) shareholders regarding CG.  The debate 
on the need for good CG has reignited due to the 2007/2008 financial crisis (Francis et al., 
2012). This study, consequently, investigates an important policy question of whether firm-
level CG affects investment decisions of major shareholders, with a particular focus on the 
periods before and during the financial crisis. Specifically, this study uses a unique corporate 
setting in the UK, where the emphasis is on encouraging CG rather than imposing extensive 
mandatory requirements. Our empirical tests are direct and provide statistical evidence than 
that obtained through a survey. In addition, the scope of this study covers different types of 
major shareholders, rather than solely institutional investors and the time period spanning the 
recent financial crisis. Since most of the previous studies have looked at the non-crisis period, 
the results of this study would provide additional insights. 
     The purpose of this study is to provide empirical evidence on the effects of CG 
mechanisms on the investment decisions made by major shareholders. Four specific questions 
are raised: 
- Does overall CG affect major shareholders’ investment decisions?  
- Which specific aspects of CG are more important in affecting the investment 
decisions of major shareholders? 
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- Do different types of major shareholders react differently to changes in CG? 
- Have the recent financial crisis changed the relationship between CG and major 
shareholders’ investment decisions? 
     This study extends and contributes to previous studies in a number of ways. First, unlike 
the previous studies that have narrowly investigated institutional investors only, this paper 
provides evidence regarding a wider range of different types of major shareholders, and,  
complements previous studies on this topic (such as Gompers and Metrick (2001) and 
Ferreira and Matos (2008)). Second, UK regulations emphasise encouraging CG rather than 
imposing extensive mandatory requirements as in the US. In addition, the legal system in the 
UK provides significant protection for investors. Therefore, focusing on UK as a less 
regulated environment and high investor protection is of interest as most of the previous 
studies have been done in emerging economies rather than developed countries. Third, the 
study is distinguished from prior literature by examining the preferences of major 
shareholders regarding CG during an interesting period (i.e., from 2005 to 2009), thereby 
providing important empirical insights on the role of CG in influencing the preferences of 
major shareholders both before and during the financial crisis. Finally, in contrast to most 
previous studies in which CG variables had been experienced in isolation, this paper 
examines the impact of CG using a composite measure of twenty-six dimensions and five 
sub-indices of CG. To make our study more objective, we developed our own CG index 
instead of using existing CG ratings that have been developed and published by commercial 
organisations.  
Our CG Index is based solely on the information disclosed in annual reports in order 
to gain an unbiased view of the firm’s corporate governance and to follow the requirements 
of the UK combined code.  The developed CG index covers five sub-indices, namely the 
following: board composition and independence, board practices and processes, 
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 5
compensation, accountability and audits, and relations with shareholders. Therefore, the use 
of this index is designed to capture the overall quality of CG instead of focusing on specific 
components. Hence, the crafted CG index provides a robust and validated measuring tool that 
allows us to shed important empirical insights on the impact of CG mechanisms on attracting 
shareholders. 
     Using a sample of UK FTSE-350 companies over the period 2005-2009, we find a 
significant positive relationship between overall CG and total major shareholdings. When 
classifying major shareholdings into different types, we find that CG affects only institutional 
shareholders. The identified relationship between CG sub-indices and major shareholdings 
provides strong evidence that firms with better board composition and independence attract 
more major shareholders. In addition, our results indicate that different types of major 
shareholders have heterogeneous preferences regarding different CG provisions. We find that 
there are strong preferences of insurance companies and pension funds for companies with 
better accountability and audit, and strong preferences other institutional major shareholders 
for companies with good board composition and independence. The results also show that the 
financial crisis has significantly changed the investment preferences of major UK 
shareholders during the financial crisis period. Taken together, these results appear to indicate 
that improvements to CG, especially in the board composition and independence aspect, 
attract more major shareholders.  
     The results of this study can serve as a reference point and specify the path that should be 
followed by a company if it has the desire to increase its shareholder base, and, in particular, 
to attract large shareholders. Our results also provide evidence that during times of financial 
trouble, improving a particular sub-index of CG will attract investors. The evidence in this 
study also suggests that regulators and policy makers should draw on these results to revise 
the regulations of CG that will help and support companies in their efforts to improve CG 
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practices and, mainly, board effectiveness. In this regard, our results call for more stringent 
CG requirements in order to provide more protection for investors and to pass up any 
negative consequences that may come up from non-compliance.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The section titled “Literature 
Review and Hypotheses Development” reviews the related literature and outlines the 
development of the hypotheses. The “Sampling and Empirical Models” section describes the 
sample, the variables, and the empirical models used in our analysis. The section titled 
“Empirical Results and Analysis” discusses the empirical results. The final section titled 
“Summary and Concluding Remarks” presents the concluding remarks. 
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Agency Theory and Shareholders’ Preferences 
This study attempts to discover the effects of CG mechanisms on the major shareholdings of 
a sample of UK listed companies. Our hypotheses can be explained using agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) where economic conflicts across owners and managers can be 
mitigated through CG (O’Sullivan, 2000). La Porta et al. (2000) indicate that potential 
shareholders view CG as a set of mechanisms for the protection of their interests in the 
company. In addition, firms with poor governance structures are more likely to expropriate 
value from outside investors (Ferreira and Matos, 2008).  Consequently, major shareholders 
prefer to allocate their investments to firms with better CG.  
     It is worth mentioning that the agency theory does not differentiate between the types of 
major shareholders. However, many studies have recently acknowledged that the identities of 
these shareholders have different implications for firms because of their differing objectives 
(Tihanyi et al., 2003; Tribo et al., 2007). Consequently, in this study, the aim is not only to 
focus on the preferences of major shareholders but also to examine whether these preferences 
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regarding CG vary with the different types of major shareholders. Therefore, to address 
heterogeneity among major shareholders, major shareholders are initially classified into 
different types, as will be explained later.   
Major Shareholders’ Preferences and CG 
Two main streams of research must be considered when examining the relationship between 
CG and ownership structure. The first stream concerns the effect of ownership structure on 
CG (the effectiveness of large shareholders in CG). Because large-percentage holdings will 
increase the motivation of major shareholders to monitor companies (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986), extensive research has been devoted to the important monitoring role of major 
shareholders (Cornett et al., 2007). Major shareholders have become active in CG and have 
become more eager to use their ownership rights to force management to advance 
shareholder interests (Hartzell and Starks, 2003).  For example several studies find that the 
presence of significant institutional ownership results in improved compensation practices 
(Hartzell and Starks (2003), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Dong and Ozkan (2008)).  
     The second stream of research addresses shareholders’ preferences about CG. Li et al. 
(2006) conducted a study on the macro level that involved a comparison of the patterns of 
block shareholders in different countries. They found that variations depended on macro CG 
aspects, including disclosure requirements, law enforcement and the level of shareholder 
protection. Other studies have found that the proportion of institutions that hold a firm’s 
shares increases with the firm’s governance quality (Chung and Zhang 2011). They also 
indicated that these institutions are attracted to firms with good CG in order to meet their 
fiduciary responsibility as well as to minimise monitoring and exit costs. Bae and Goyal 
(2010) revealed that firms with better governance attracted more foreign ownership than 
poorly governed firms while Kim et al. (2010) found that domestic investors tend to care less 
about CG than their foreign counterparts. Therefore, the results of these previous studies 
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indicated that major shareholders prefer investing in countries with high accounting 
disclosures and better shareholder rights. However, at the firm level, major shareholders 
prefer large companies that pay dividends and have better quality CG. Most of these studies 
focus more heavily on institutional investors and pay less attention to other types of major 
shareholders. In addition, most of these studies have been done in emerging economies rather 
than developed countries, raising the question of whether CG quality matters in developed 
countries that have good shareholders protection. This study, therefore, sheds light on the 
different types of major shareholders and their preferences about CG by examining the UK, a 
developed country with considerable shareholder protections and rights.  
     Based on the studies of Chung and Zhang (2011) and Ferreira and Matos (2008) that 
revealed a positive association between the proportion of a firm’s shares held by institutional 
investors and its governance quality, we also hypothesise that there is a positive relationship 
between the major shareholdings and CG. According to agency theory, companies with better 
CG have lower agency costs, generate higher returns and perform better (Henry, 2010; 
Klapper and Love, 2004). Investors have strong incentives to put their investments in good 
CG companies, and hence, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between CG and the level of major 
shareholdings. 
 
     CG provisions do not have the same effect in attracting investors; in their study, Chung 
and Zhang (2011) showed that institutional investors are attracted only to two CG aspects: 
one is related to strengthening shareholder rights, and the other is related to the composition 
and operation of the board of directors. This shows that there are differences in the effects of 
CG provisions; i.e., that of all of the CG provisions, institutional investors pay more attention 
to only the above-mentioned ones.  In the same vein, Khurshed et al. (2011) examined the 
effect of two internal CG mechanisms on institutional major holdings; they considered both 
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 9
directors’ ownership and board composition in a sample of UK companies.  Their findings 
revealed a negative relationship between institutional major holdings and directors’ 
ownership, but on the other hand it showed a positive effect of board composition on 
institutional major holdings. Accordingly, it is recommended that institutional major 
shareholders view ownership by directors as a substitute control mechanism, while board 
composition is perceived to be a complementary mechanism. These findings indicate that 
there are differences in the effect of CG sub-indices on the investment decisions of 
shareholders. Based on the above, one may expect that CG sub-indices will have different 
effect on major shareholdings. Hence, the hypothesis is stated as follows:  
Hypothesis 2: The preferences of major shareholders vary across different dimensions 
of CG.  
 
     Prior research documented that large shareholders differ from each other along different 
dimensions, such as their beliefs, skills, or preferences. Consistent with prior literature (e.g., 
Bushee, 1998; Bushee et al., 2010; Chung and Zhang, 2011; Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 
2009) this study aims to contribute to the literature by examining the preferences of different 
categories of major shareholders regarding CG. Prior research indicated that the identity of 
institutional investors has important implications for firms because they have different 
objectives and philosophies; for example, they may be constrained by fiduciary 
responsibilities or political concerns (Bushee et al., 2010). Therefore, it is important to 
distinguish among different types of shareholders, not only in terms of institutional investors 
but among all major shareholders, when examining their preferences. Giannetti and Simonov 
(2006) examined whether investors consider the quality of CG in making their stock 
selections. They differentiated between two types of investors, those who enjoy private 
benefits, and others who enjoy only security benefits. Their results showed that all investors, 
whether domestic or foreign, institutional or small individual investors (who generally place 
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great value on security benefits), are less likely to invest in companies with poor CG. On the 
contrary, investors who have relationships with company insiders generally do not mind 
putting their investments in companies that have poor CG. Moreover, Kim et al (2010) 
revealed that foreign and local investors have different stock valuations regarding CG.  They 
revealed that since foreign investors assign higher monitoring costs, they may discount CG 
more severely than other domestic investors. In the same vein, Ferreira and Matos (2008) 
differentiated between independent and grey investors, showing that independent investors 
gave more attention to stock in countries with higher levels of legal enforcement and paid 
more attention to liquid stock than other grey investors. However, their results indicated that 
they commonly preferred to invest in visible firms, large firms, and firms with strong CG 
indicators. Similarly, Chung and Zhang (2011) examined whether different institutional 
investors exhibited different preferences about CG structures. They found that all different 
categories of institutional shareholdings had positive associations with CG; but they also 
indicated that the strength of the relationship varies among the various categories of 
institutional shareholdings. 
     Prior research suggested that various categories of investors have different investment 
preferences in general, and regarding CG in particular. However, most of these studies have 
been concerned with differentiating among various types of institutional investors. For 
example, Chung and Zhang (2011) indicated that various categories of institutional investors 
such as insurance firms, bank trusts, independent advisors, etc. have different investment 
preferences due to differences in their fiduciary responsibilities. Moreover, there is limited 
research about other types of major shareholders. A study by Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach 
(2009) pointed out that large shareholders have distinctly different investment and 
governance styles. Therefore, we state the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 3: Different types of major shareholders have different preferences 
regarding CG. 
 
     The 2007/2008 global financial crisis1has caused many economies around the world to go 
into recession (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). There has been much speculation that the 
2007/2008 stock market meltdown was at least partly due to CG shortcomings, such as 
excessive risk taking by managers who were concerned more about short-term bonuses but 
ignored the long-term value of their companies (Zingales, 2008). Yet, a systematic analysis of 
how CG affected ownership structure during this turbulent period is lacking. This study 
pioneers the effort to address this gap. Therefore, whether this relationship has strengthened 
during the financial crisis period is tested. 
     Most studies conducted during the period of the financial crisis examined the impact of 
CG on the performance of firms. Beltratti and Stulz (2009) found that banks with better CG 
performed better during the credit crisis. In addition, Leung and Horwitz (2010) examined the 
effect of management ownership and other governance variables on the stock performance of 
Hong Kong firms following the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Their study showed that 
companies with a more concentrated management ownership structure displayed better 
capital market performance during that period. Moreover, Elkinawy (2005), focusing on an 
emerging country during the financial crisis of the late 1990s, showed that liquidity, trade 
links and CG were considered important determinants for mutual fund portfolio choices 
during the crisis. These results seem to imply that companies with good CG quality 
performed better during times of crisis, and that investors considered CG to be a major 
concern in their investment decisions. Contrary to previous study by Elkinawy (2005) that 
focused on emerging markets; this study examines the preferences of major shareholders in a 
                                                            
1 This paper considers the influence of the financial crisis had started in 2008; this is why the study classify the time period to pre-crisis 
(2005 to 2007) and during-crisis (2008 to 2009).  
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developed country like the UK during the 2007/2008 financial crisis period. It is expected 
that major shareholders consider the effect of CG on wealth and risk of their shareholdings 
differently in crisis-versus non-crisis periods. So, it is hypothesised that the association 
between CG and major shareholdings will be strengthened during periods of financial crisis. 
Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: There was a change in the relationship between CG and major 
shareholdings during the financial crisis. 
 
Sampling and Empirical Models 
Sample 
The target population of this study is the UK FTSE-350, whose constituents make up 
approximately 90 per cent of the entire UK market capitalisation. An important justification 
for choosing these companies is that this study aims at testing the relationships between CG 
and major shareholdings on a sample of large UK companies. In the current study, a panel 
dataset is used that covers the period from 2005 to 2009 inclusive. An important motivation 
for selecting this time period is that it followed the issuance of the Combined Code of CG in 
2003, the first UK CG code that was later amended in 2006, 2008, 2010, and 20121. 
Moreover, this period also covers the period preceding and during the 2007/2008 financial 
crisis and thus selecting this time period enables a comparison of the relationship between 
CG and major shareholdings both before and during the crisis period. Additionally, this time 
period enables investigating whether CG effect on major shareholdings and its effects on 
different categories of major shareholdings differ over years. 
     The sample selected is based upon the following criteria. First, companies must have been 
active for the entire period of the study, as the objective of this study is to examine the 
                                                            
1
 The current version of the code is referred to as the UK Corporate Governance Code (2012). 
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relation between CG and major shareholdings for firms that survived during the financial 
crisis and this would facilitate the comparison in the period preceding and during the 
2007/2008 financial crisis. Therefore, after excluding delisted companies, the total number of 
companies was reduced to 221 firms. Second, financial and utility (63) firms are excluded for 
a number of reasons: (i) the composition of the assets of both types of firms tends to be 
‘special’ rather than ‘typical’; (ii) utility firms tend to have high leverage in terms of capital 
structure; and (iii) financial firms in the UK operate under strict government regulations and 
monitoring (Mehran et al., 2011). Lastly, 19 companies without complete financial or 
corporate governance data were excluded. These criteria reduce the final sample to 139 non-
financial companies, for which complete data were available across all years of the sampling 
period. Therefore, the empirical work comprises 139 firms with complete data throughout 
2005-2009. The analysis was carried out on a sample of balanced panel data, covering a 
period of five years, and is based on a sample of companies drawn from eight main 
industries, resulting in a total of 695 firm-year observations. Data about major shareholdings 
and CG were collected manually from the annual reports of the companies via either FAME 
(Financial Analysis Made Easy) database or, if unavailable, the company’s website. All 
financial data have been obtained from the DataStream database. 
Variable Measurement and Model Specification 
Dependent Variables 
Major shareholdings (TOTAL_MAJ) are measured by the percentages of shares held by the 
shareholders with no less than three per cent ownership; shareholders below this level do not 
have to be disclosed in the UK. Data for major shareholdings was collected manually from 
the annual reports of the companies. Further distinctions between different categories of 
major shareholdings were made; major shareholdings were grouped into seven categories. 
The first category is major shareholdings by insurance companies and pension funds (MAJ1). 
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The second category includes major shareholdings by other financial institutions (MAJ2), 
such as banks, mutual, nominee/trust/trustees and the like. The third category is major 
shareholdings by other companies (MAJ3) that are not included in the previous two 
categories. The category of “other companies” refers to companies involved in manufacturing 
activities or in trading activities and includes companies active in B2B or B2C non-financial 
services. The fourth category (MAJ4) includes major shareholdings by states, governmental 
agencies, governmental departments or local authorities. The fifth category includes major 
shareholdings by shareholders who are closely tied to the firm, such as managers and 
directors (MAJ5). The sixth category encompasses major shareholdings by other families and 
individuals who are outsiders (MAJ6). The seventh and final category includes major 
shareholdings by others (MAJ7). 
 
Independent Variables 
The main independent variable of interest is CG_SCORE which is a composite measure 
consisting of twenty-six CG dimensions. Reviewing the literature that considers the impact of 
CG on ownership structure revealed that previous studies predominantly focused on few 
dimensions of CG, such as the study by Matsumoto and Uchida (2010), which considered 
only board structure and stock options. In the same vein, Ferreira and Matos (2008) 
considered only the percentage of ownership structure (insider ownership), with other firm-
level variables that affect the investment decisions of institutional investors within 27 
different countries. Kim et al. (2010) only considered outside directors and their 
independence as CG variables that affect the compositions of foreign investors’ portfolios. 
On the other hand, the study by Chung and Zhang (2011) is considered to be the only study 
that used a comprehensive CG index. They used Institutional Shareholder Services CG scores 
to examine the effect of CG on institutional ownership. They used ready-made CG grades, 
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only excluding the “Director Education” category; they also included the dual class standard 
in the ISS index. In contrast, we have adopted researcher-constructed CG index approach for 
the following reasons: First, unlike subjective analysts’ rankings, which are based on their 
perceptions of CG quality, the crafted CG index in this study is based on actual disclosures in 
the firms’ annual reports. Annual report disclosure is considered an important source for 
larger shareholders, as they consider information disclosed in annual reports when making 
investment decisions.  Previous studies regarding the most preferred sources for institutional 
investors pointed out that the highest ranked sources were generally written company 
information, including the financial reports. This renders the information more objective, 
reliable and accurate. Second, the importance of CG variables varies according to industry, 
company, and country, as well as varying over time (Donker and Zahir, 2008). Therefore, a 
self-constructed CG index approach gives us the ability to choose the sample and to select the 
relevant CG provisions. Academic-constructed indexes are based on fewer CG provisions 
that are more targeted to the sample firms (Bozec & Bozec, 2012). Thus, this approach allows 
us to focus on CG provisions that primarily relate to our research focus, while at the same 
time reflecting the requirement of the UK Combined Code (2003), which is widely 
considered as an international benchmark for good CG practices.  
     The CG index (CG_SCORE) of the sample companies serves as a broad measure of firm-
specific CG quality and reflects 26 governance attributes that are considered “good” CG 
practices. The crafted CG index is constructed after reviewing the previously developed 
indices and identifying their commonalities. The 26 firm-level governance provisions that are 
included in the index are commonly used in the related literature, and include measures of: 
(1) board composition and independence (BCII), (2) board practice and process (BPPI), (3) 
compensation (CI), (4) accountability and audit (AAI), and (5) relations with shareholders 
(RSI). Each sub-index, in turn, includes a series of CG attributes. In the same vein, an equally 
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weighted index is adopted; if the company adopted the item, a score of one is given to the CG 
variable and 0 otherwise. To compute the score for each sub-index, we sum the elements of 
each sub-index and then divide it by the maximum score by any company. A total 
CG_SCORE for each firm is calculated by the summing of the sub-indices divided by five 
(the number of sub-indices). Appendix 1 details the governance attributes collected and the 
scoring technique employed. 
Moreover, it is vital to assess the validity of the index, especially when using a newly 
constructed measuring instrument (i.e. CG index). Validity is defined as “whether an 
instrument actually measures what it sets out to measure” (Field, 2009: 11). In this context, 
Saunders et al., (2012) suggested three methods for assessing validity: (1) face validity, (2) 
content validity and (3) construct validity. First, face validity aims to ensure that the measure 
appears, on the face of it, to measure the concept which is intended to measure (Saunders et 
al., 2012). The face validity of the CG index is supported through the pre-testing which is a 
significant step in ensuring its reliability and validity (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012; Hussey 
and Hessey 1997). To check the appropriateness of the CG index for measuring CG, the 
initial index was sent to five academics to refine the index and identify any gaps or 
inconsistencies. This checking process helped to modify the CG items in the index.  
Second, content validity aims to “ensure that the measure includes an adequate and 
representative set of items that tap the concept” (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010: 206). In 
addition, Saunders et al. (2012) referred to content validity as the sufficient items being 
included in the measurement tool. Content validity of the CG index can be achieved by the 
careful definition of the research phenomena through literature review of CG and also by 
using a panel of professional judges to judge which items are to be included in the 
measurement (Vaus, 2002). In the current study, the initial CG index was pre-tested with five 
academics to check whether the CG items in the index adequately measure the level of CG 
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(content validity). The results of pre-test method showed that the CG index captures adequate 
and representative set of dimensions to assess good CG. 
Finally, construct validity “ensures that the results obtained from the use of a measure are 
consistent with the theories in which the test is designed” (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010: 207). 
The assessment of construct validity requires the examination of the correlation between the 
total CG index and its component sub-indices (see for example; Black et al. 2012; and 
Hassan, 2012). In the current study, the Pearson correlation between CG_SCORE and its sub-
indices (BCII, BPPI, AAI, CI, and RSI) is positively significant, with correlation coefficients 
from 0.7969 to 0.3661 at the 0.0001 level.  
Control Variables 
We have selected a wide range of variables to control for potential omitted variable bias 
based on a review of prior studies (Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001). These control variables 
covered firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), turnover (TURN), dividend yield (DIVIDEND), 
stock price (PRICE), profitability (ROA), firm value (Tobin’s Q) and stock return 
(RETURN). A large set of control variables ar  employed that have previously been 
recognised as determinants of shareholders’ investment decisions. Following earlier work 
that acknowledged that investors prefer large companies, the size of firms is included (e.g., 
Aggarwal et al., 2005; Gompers and Metrick, 2001). The natural logarithm of total assets is 
used as a proxy for firm size (SIZE) in this paper. The level of leverage is included as a proxy 
for the risk level of a firm (LEV), which is measured, by the debt-to-assets ratio (Chung and 
Zhang, 2011). Elkinawy (2005) mentions that fund managers prefer firms with low leverage. 
To control for stock liquidity preferences, turnover (TURN) is also included, which is 
measured by dividing the number of shares traded over the year by the number of shares 
outstanding (Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Huang (2008) and Elkinawy (2005) pointed out that 
fund managers tilt their holdings more heavily toward liquid stocks. Moreover, Jain (2007) 
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revealed that institutional investors prefer to put their investment in stocks with a low-
dividend yield, while individual investors prefer stocks with high dividend yields; therefore, 
dividend yield (DIVIDEND) is included. Stock price (PRICE) is measured by the annual 
stock price. Furthermore, firm profitability and firm values are measured by return on assets 
(ROA) and Tobin’s Q (TQ), respectively (Chung and Zhang, 2011). Kim et al. (2010) found 
that investors prefer companies with higher TQ and higher ROA.  Moreover, we consider 
stock return measured by the annual (end-of-year) geometric stock rate of return (Ferreira and 
Matos, 2008). 
 
Empirical Models 
This study uses four models to test the relationship between CG and major shareholding. The 
first model tests the relationship between the CG_SCORE and the total major shareholdings, 
after including all of the control variables, as expressed in the following equation: 
 
TOTAL_MAJit = α i + β1 CG_SCOREit + β2 SIZEit + β3 LEVit + β4 TURNit + β5 
DIVIDENDit + β6 ROAit + β7 TQit + β8 PRICEit + β9 RETURNit 
+ uit                                                                                        (1) 
 
     In this model, TOTAL_MAJ is defined as the percentage of shares owned by shareholders 
with at least 3% of the company shares; CG_SCORE represents the CG index; SIZE is the 
natural log of total assets; LEV is calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets; TURN is 
the annual share volume over the year, divided by shares outstanding; DIVIDEND is 
measured as dividends per share / market price-year end * 100; ROA represents the firm’s 
operating performance, measured as the ratio of net income to total assets; TQ is measured as 
the market value of equity + total debts / total assets; price represents the annual stock price; 
and RETURN is the annual (end-of-year) geometric stock rate of return. 
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     Model 2 examines the relationship between CG sub-indices and the total major 
shareholdings, as expressed in the following equation: 
TOTAL_MAJit = α i + β1 BCIIit + β2 BPPIit + β3 CIit+ β4 AAIit + β5 RSIit + β6 
SIZEit + β7 LEVit + β8 TURNit + β9 DIVIDENDit + β10 ROAit + 
β11 TQit + β12 PRICEit + β13 RETURNit + uit                             (2) 
 
     In this model, BCII is a measure of the board composition and independence index; BPPI 
is a measure of the board practice and process index; CI is a measure of the compensation 
index; AAI is a measure of the accountability and audit index; and RSI is a measure of the 
relationship with shareholders index. Other variables are as defined in the model (1). 
     To estimate the relationship between CG and different types of major shareholders, we re-
estimate the previous two models, but using the percentage of shares held by each type of 
major shareholder as independent variables. 
     In studies of corporate governance, there is always concern about potential endogeneity.  
Most previous studies documented at least two potential sources of endogeneity that may 
derail empirical results: simultaneity and unobservable heterogeneity (Wintoki et al., 2009). 
This study employs two approaches to address this problem. First, previous studies suggested 
that the use of lagged values for the main explanatory variable can diminish simultaneity 
problems (see for example; Larcker and Rusticus, 2010; Stiebale, 2011). Following previous 
studies, the lagged value of CG is used to mitigate possible simultaneity problems between 
CG and major shareholdings. Second, a broad number of control variables are included in this 
study that help mitigate the omitted-variable bias as well as the possibility that our results are 
affected by endogeneity. Moreover, we used panel data regressions, which help to address 
issues of endogeneity that might arise from unobserved firm-specific heterogeneities (Black 
et al., 2006). Panel data regression techniques help to control for the unobserved 
heterogeneity component that remains fixed over time, thus reducing considerably the 
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omitted variable bias problem (Baltagi, 2009). Given the panel nature of the data, we test 
which model is appropriate using a Hausman test, fixed and random-effect models 
(Wooldridge, 2002). If the results reject the null hypothesis, suggesting that the fixed effect 
model should be used (this test is included in each of the regression tables). Furthermore, in 
all panel data regression models, a robust standard error is used. It is common to rely on 
“robust” standard errors in order to ensure valid statistical inference.  
Empirical Results and Analysis 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table (1) provides the descriptive statistics for the dependent (major shareholdings), 
independent (total CG index and all sub-indices) and control variables for each year as well 
as for the whole period (2005-2009), the pre-crisis period (2005–2007) and the during-crisis 
period (2008–2009), respectively. A number of interesting results can be derived from the 
descriptive statistics. First, and consistent with the results of Aggarwal et al (2010), there is 
an increase in major shareholdings over time. More specifically, the average major 
shareholding (TOTAL_MAJ) increases during the whole period (2005–2009) from 32.32 per 
cent to 38.17 per cent, and from 33.81 per cent (pre-crisis) to 38.21 per cent (during-crisis). 
The average value of total major shareholdings (TOTAL_MAJ) for our sample is 35.56 per 
cent. In addition, among the seven different types of major shareholdings, the highest average 
is obtained in the category of shareholdings of pension fund and insurance companies 
(MAJ1) and shareholdings of other institutional investors (MAJ2), with averages of 5.91 per 
cent and 21.09 per cent, respectively. We also find the lowest average of major shareholdings 
in shareholdings of states, governmental agencies, governmental departments or local 
authorities (MAJ4; mean .0503 per cent). Interestingly, all different types of major 
shareholdings increase from the pre- to the during-crisis period, except for MAJ7. 
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     Second, the average CG_SCORE was found to increase from 0.8140 (2005) to 0.8569 
(2009); it also increased from 0.8246 before the crisis to 0.8529 during the financial crisis. 
This indicates that there has been a notable improvement in UK corporate governance during 
the financial crisis, as there is 3.43 per cent increase in CG_SCORE during the crisis period. 
In the same vein, the CG sub-indices similarly depict overall CG behaviour. Our results 
reveal that the average score for AAI (accountability and audit index) was the highest at 
0.9576. On the other hand, RSI (relationship with shareholders) was ranked the lowest with 
an average score of 0.6398. In the same vein, Table (1) provides a closer analysis of the CG 
sub-indices before and during the financial crisis to gain additional insights. The average 
scores for all CG sub-indices have increased from (pre-crisis) to (during crisis), suggesting a 
generally improving trend in CG behaviour over time. This indicates that UK listed 
companies tend to comply with the recommendations of the CG code during a financial crisis 
in order to rebuild trust and to protect shareholders’ interests. Table (1) also shows that the 
average natural logarithm of total assets is 21.41, denoting average total assets of £7.33 
billion, thus indicating that our sample consists of companies that are relatively large. The 
average ROA (LEV) is 7.8% (24.63%). In addition, the mean (median) values for TURN 
ratio, DIVIDEND and PRICE are 2.22 (1.66), 2.8 (2.54) and 6.611 (4.507), respectively. 
Furthermore, the average TQ was 1.50 (1.24), suggesting that the companies are valued 
highly in the stock market, and finally, the average annual stock return is 0.0008. 
     Lastly, drawing on the analysis of the descriptive statistics, the primary policy implication 
for policy makers and regulatory authorities is that more consideration needs to be paid to 
strengthening the requirements for board composition and independence that are related to 
building relationships with shareholders, and by the same token improving the quality of CG.  
[Table 1 around here] 
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Tables (2) and (3) report the correlation matrix among the independent variables. In the 
correlation matrix, we attempt to identify whether the correlation between the independent 
variables is higher than 0.80 (and therefore to be considered of concern) (Belsley et al., 
1980). Looking at both correlation matrices, we find nothing that raises alarm. 
[Tables 2 and 3 around here] 
Econometric Analysis 
Regression Results of CG and Total Major Shareholdings 
To test the relationship between total major shareholdings (TOTAL_MAJ) and CG scores, 
we use two types of models. We first perform a regression using the lagged value of CG; by 
using (t-1) variable, since it is expected that investors (major shareholders) may take time to 
react after they assess the information disclosed in the annual reports, and to minimise the 
simultaneity problem. In model (2), we examine the impact of the previous year’s change in 
CG as well as the changes in the control variables on those of the major shareholdings. Here, 
we test whether levels of and changes in major shareholdings are associated with levels of 
and changes in governance mechanisms. 
     In Table (4), model (1) major shareholding (TOTAL_MAJ) is the dependent variable, 
while firm-level governance index is the explanatory variable of interest; this is lagged by 
one year. Therefore, if major shareholding is for period t, the CG_SCORE is measured at 
period t-1. We also include all of the control variables identified in the existing literature.  
Our results show that CG_SCORE is positively associated with major shareholdings. This 
means that major shareholders consider CG when making their investment decisions. Model 
(1) also indicates that major shareholders prefer companies with high leverage and companies 
with high liquidity. In addition, it shows that they prefer companies with lower stock returns. 
Model (2) addresses the results for regression analyses, with changes in major shareholding 
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as the dependent variable. The main explanatory variable is the lagged changes in CG score; 
all other independent variables are expressed in terms of changes. The results show that 
changes in major shareholdings are not significantly associated with changes in the CG score. 
These results provide empirical support for H1 and the findings of previous studies that 
indicated the importance of CG to investors (Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Giannetti and 
Simonov, 2006; Khurshed et al., 2011). It also provides further empirical support for agency 
theory. One theoretical implication of this finding is that that the investors have strong 
incentives to choose stocks of corporations with good governance structures. Hence, 
companies commit to high levels of CG_SCORE in order to alleviate agency conflicts 
(agency theory), making the company more attractive to investors by increasing investor 
trust. 
[Table 4 around here] 
     The previous tests show that CG_SCORE affects major shareholdings (TOTAL_MAJ); 
however, we are also interested in examining the impact of particular CG provisions on major 
shareholdings. Thus, following the study of Chung and Zhang (2011), which examined the 
impact of certain CG mechanisms on institutional shareholdings, we will examine the impact 
of CG sub-indices on major shareholdings. Table (5) represents the results of the relationship 
between CG sub-indices and total major shareholdings (TOTAL_MAJ). We run two different 
regression models, as in Table (4). In Model (1), the results indicate that the board 
composition and the independence index (BCII) have a significant and positive relationship 
with major shareholdings. This indicates that major shareholders consider the BCII when 
taking their investment decisions. Chung and Zhang (2011) reached the same result, but they 
considered only institutional investors, and their results indicated that board composition is 
one of the most important provisions that attract institutional investors. Model (1) also 
indicates that major shareholders also prefer companies with high leverage and lower stock 
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returns.  This result suggests that H2 is empirically supported; the results show that the BCII 
is the only CG index that matters for the investment decisions of total major shareholders. 
This evidence supports the results of past studies. Chung and Zhang (2011) indicated that 
board composition is one of the most important provisions that attract institutional investors. 
In a study of the UK, Khurshed et al. (2011) found that institutional major shareholdings are 
positively associated with board composition. In addition, the study of McCahery et al. 
(2010) indicated that, among other factors, board independence was considered important by 
institutional investors. 
     Model (2) addresses the changes in CG sub-indices and their effects on the changes in 
major shareholdings. We find that changes in CG sub-indices do not have any significant 
relationship with changes in major shareholdings. Regarding the other control variables, the 
results indicate that changes in leverage and liquidity have the same positive association with 
the changes in major shareholdings. Also, this result indicates that changes in PRICE have a 
positive relationship with changes in major shareholdings, but changes in stock return have a 
negative relationship with changes in major shareholdings. 
[Table 5 around here] 
 
Regression Results of CG and Total Major Shareholdings Pre- and During the 
Financial Crisis 
One of the main contributions of this study is to examine an important policy question of 
whether firm-level CG affects the major shareholdings before and during global financial 
crisis periods. To test whether this relationship was affected by the credit crunch, we classify 
the time period of the analysis into pre-crisis (2005 to 2007) and during-crisis (2008 to 2009) 
periods, and retest the previous relationship for both these periods. Table (6) illustrates the 
regression analysis; the results show the impact of the previous year’s CG scores on major 
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shareholdings. This model indicates that the relationship has changed in the period during the 
crisis, since there was no relationship between CG and major shareholdings in the pre-crisis 
period. Investors may therefore pay less attention to the quality of CG when investment 
opportunities are plentiful (Table 6, Model 1). However, in the during-crisis period, there is a 
positive and significant relationship between CG and major shareholdings (Table 6, Model 
2). This means that the improvement in CG (3.43 % increase in CG_SCORE during the crisis 
period) attracted more shareholders to allocate their investments. It also indicates that major 
shareholders considered CG an important factor in their portfolio choices during the financial 
crisis. Therefore, we accept the fourth hypothesis (H4), confirming that the relationship 
between CG scores and major shareholdings has changed during the financial crisis. 
[Table 6 around here] 
     Regarding the CG sub-indices, Table (7) shows the results of the regression between CG 
sub-indices and major shareholdings before and during the financial crisis. The relationship 
between BCII and major shareholding (TOTAL_MAJ) has changed in the period during the 
financial crisis, since there was no significant relationship between BCII and major 
shareholdings before the financial crisis (Table 7, Model 1). However, during the crisis 
period, there is a significant and positive relation between them. This means that the 
improvement in BCII (there was a 5.84% increase in BCII during the crisis period) attracts 
major shareholders. There are increases in other CG sub-indices during the crisis period 
compared to before it. However, Table 7 (Model 2) indicates that there are no changes in the 
relation between other CG sub-indices and major shareholdings before and during the crisis 
period. This result is consistent with other results indicating that BCII is more important than 
other CG sub-indices.  This result reveals that board of directors is an important internal CG 
mechanism that monitors and advises management to protect shareholders’ interest and offers 
empirical support for the results of Adams and Ferreira (2007) and (Francis et al., 2012). 
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 [Table 7 around here] 
 
Regression Results of CG and Different Types of Major Shareholdings 
To examine if different types of major shareholders have different preferences of CG (H3), 
the previous multiple regressions that examines the association between CG and total major 
shareholdings is re-estimated by replacing the TOTAL_MAJ with each type of major 
shareholding. Table (8) shows that CG scores affect the investment decisions of other 
institutional investors (MAJ2) but have no effect on the other types of major shareholdings. 
The positive association between CG and institutional major shareholding offers empirical 
support for the results of Bushee et al. (2010), Chung and Zhang (2011), Khurshed et al. 
(2011) and the Russell Reynolds Associates survey (2003, 2005), pointing out the important 
role played by firms’ corporate governance mechanisms in the investment decisions of 
institutional investors. Considering control variables, as shown in table (8), also indicates that 
MAJ1 also have preferences for larger firms and firms with higher liquidity, while MAJ2 
prefer to invest in small companies with lower returns. In addition, MAJ3 prefer firms that 
pay fewer dividends. Like MAJ1, MAJ6 also appear to prefer liquidity. Lastly, this analysis 
shows that MAJ7 prefer companies with higher leverage and higher stock returns; on the 
other hand, both MAJ1 and MAJ2 exhibit contrarian behaviours in terms of stock returns. 
     In an unreported additional regression that was run using the aggregate institutional 
investors, the CG_SCORE coefficients remain positive and statistically significantly related 
to the aggregate institutional investors. This may be explained by the fact that institutional 
shareholders build up large stakes in some companies and therefore have a keen interest in 
ensuring that companies run well. In conclusion, hypothesis H3 is supported; the results show 
that different major shareholders have different preferences regarding CG, providing 
evidence that only institutional investors consider CG in their investment decisions.  
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[Table 8 around here] 
     Table (9) indicates that the previous year’s changes in CG scores affect only the changes 
in investment decisions of other institutional investors (MAJ2). This is similar to the results 
reported by Chung and Zhang (2011), meaning that institutional shareholders adjust their 
investments based on the previous year’s changes in CG scores. In terms of the control 
variables, MAJ6 and MAJ7 prefer companies with higher leverage, while MAJ5 prefer higher 
stock returns. Moreover, we find that insurance companies and pension funds (MAJ1) and 
other companies (MAJ3) have the same preferences regarding liquidity, as they prefer more 
liquid companies. Consistent with other studies, these results indicate that large companies 
are preferred by insurance companies and pension funds (Kang and Stulz, 1997). 
[Table 9 around here] 
     In addition, to examine which CG indices are more important to each type of major 
shareholder, Table (10) illustrates the results of a regression analysis of CG sub-indices and 
different types of major shareholdings based on the previous year’s CG sub-indices. The 
results show a positive relationship between BCII and MAJ2, consistent with the results of 
Khurshed et al. (2011), who showed a significant positive association between institutional 
major shareholdings and board composition.  Also, Useem et al. (1993) found that board 
composition and function is important to institutional investors. In the same vein, the Russell 
Reynolds Associates survey (2003, 2005) indicated that approximately 80 per cent of UK 
institutional investors pay significant attention to the quality of a company’s board of 
directors. The results also show that there is a positive relationship between AAI and MAJ1; 
illustrating the importance of accountability and auditing to their investment decisions. In 
summary, the evidence provided above supports our third hypothesis (H3) in general. That is, 
major shareholders have different preferences in terms of CG provisions. Table (11) displays 
the regression analysis of the impact of the previous year’s changes in CG sub-indices on 
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changes in each type of major shareholdings. Model (1) shows that the previous year’s 
change in (AAI) affects the investment decisions of pension funds and insurance companies 
(MAJ1). Also, the results indicate in Model (2) that the previous year’s change in (BCII) is 
positively associated with the change in MAJ2.  
[Tables 10 and 11 around here] 
Robustness Checks 
We conducted a series of tests in order to ensure that our results are rigorous. First, we 
include the percentage of free float; the percentage of total equity that is not controlled by 
major shareholders. This extra variable may be correlated with major shareholdings and has 
therefore been added as a control variable (FREE_FLOAT). Dahlquist et al. (2003) indicated 
that investors considered a company’s free float in their investment in Swedish stocks. Again, 
the results are similar, indicating that the CG coefficient remains positive and significant and 
suggesting that this omitted variable is unlikely to explain our results (see Table 12, Model 
1). Second, we also include eight dummies for the industry sector in order to control for the 
fact that major shareholdings and CG may be industry-dependent. We control for industry 
effects through the incorporation of industry-specific dummy variables (corresponding to the 
industry classification benchmark), to control for any preferences major shareholders have for 
particular industries. Grosfeld and Hashi (2005) found that ownership concentration may vary 
across industries. The results are also invariant when adding the industry dummy variables in 
the regression between CG and MAJ1. The CG_SCORE coefficient remained positive and 
insignificant (see Table 12, Model 2). Third, to address the issue of endogenous 
determination of MAJ2, in our analysis we use both the lagged values as explanatory 
variables. We also perform a change regression and, as an additional robustness check, the 
changes regression analysis is run in the reverse direction; Aggarwal et al (2010) follow the 
same technique. Therefore, to determine if CG attracts MAJ2 or if MAJ2 drives improvement 
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in CG, the change in MAJ2 is considered as the explanatory variable and the change in CG as 
the dependent variable.  The results of this reverse change regression revealed that the 
coefficient of the change in MAJ2 is statistically insignificant (see Table 12, Model 3). This 
result provides evidence that CG affects MAJ2, but MAJ2 does not appear to affect 
governance. Thus, with an improvement in firm-level governance, MAJ2 increases. 
[Table 12 around here] 
 
Summary and Concluding Remarks  
This study investigates whether the quality of firm-level CG has any effect on the investment 
decisions of major shareholders in the UK from 2005 to 2009 (both before and during the 
financial crisis). The study is novel in that it employs a new, detailed classification for major 
shareholdings in order to explore the heterogeneity of different major shareholders regarding 
their preferences about CG. Using a sample of 139 UK FTSE 350 companies, the results 
indicate that CG compliance in the UK has increased over the study period. The results also 
provide evidence that corporate governance during the financial crisis is considerably 
different compared with the period prior to the financial crisis. Generally, UK listed 
companies appear to be motivated to comply more with the CG code recommendations 
during a financial crisis in order to rebuild shareholder trust and to improve their ability to get 
external funds at lower cost. This also implies that the companies’ decision to comply with 
CG is more likely to be influenced by institutional pressures.  
 Our results show that the significant positive relationship between CG and total major 
shareholdings that is present for the whole period is driven mainly by the CG sub-index board 
composition and independence.  Our analysis also shows that different major shareholders 
have different investment and governance preference. For example, MAJ1 is concerned only 
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with AAI and BCII is the only CG sub-index that matters to other institutional investors 
(MAJ2). When testing this relationship before and during the crisis, the results revealed that 
the insignificant effect of CG_SCORE in the pre-crisis period became significant during the 
financial crisis period, indicating that major shareholders viewed CG as particularly 
important during the crisis. Therefore, this study fills an important gap in the literature by 
providing an understanding of the role corporate governance (and specifically board 
structure) play in attracting major shareholders during crisis periods.  
     The implications of our results can indicate the path that should be followed by a company 
if it has the desire to increase its shareholder base. For example, improving a particular set of 
CG provisions may help companies to attract a particular group of major shareholders. Our 
results also provide evidence that during times of financial trouble, CG has greater influence 
as a mechanism to attract investors.  
     Lastly, our study focuses on investigating the heterogeneity of the investment preferences 
of different types of major shareholders in UK listed companies. Therefore, future research is 
needed to study heterogeneity in another institutional setting with less investor protection or 
within a cross-country context, which will provide a more explicit generalisation of our 
results. Furthermore, as our sample is restricted to non-financial firms, future studies may 
enhance the analysis by investigating financial firms. In addition, our analysis mainly focused 
on internal CG mechanisms; thus it might be interesting to investigate the effects of external 
CG mechanisms on the investment decisions of major shareholders. 
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Appendix: Corporate Governance Index 
This table identifies the criteria used in constructing the governance index. A total score for each firm is calculated each year. 
CG sub-indices CG Variables Provisions of the 
Combined Code 
(2003) 
Decision Rule 
1 = YES, 0 = No 
Board Composition 
and Independence 
Index (BCII) 
1. There should be a clear division of the roles of the chairman and chief 
executive. 
A.2.1 1/0 
 
2. The chairman should, upon appointment, meet the independence criteria. A.2.2 1/0 
 
3. At least half the board, excluding the chairman, should include non-
executive directors determined by the board to be independent. 
A.3.2 1/0 
 
4. The board should be of sufficient size7. supporting principle 1/0 
5. The board should appoint one of the independent non-executive directors 
to be the senior independent director. 
A.3.3 1/0 
 
Board Practices 
and Processes Index 
(BPPI) 
 
 
 
 
 
6. The board should meet sufficiently regularly8. A.1.1 1/0 
7. The chairman should hold meetings with the non-executive directors 
without the executives present. 
A.1.3 1/0 
 
8. The company has a nomination committee. A.4.1 1/0 
9. A majority of the nomination committee should be independent non-
executive directors. 
A.4.1 1/0 
 
                                                            
7 This item will be measured by calculating the average board size of all companies and considering this average as a benchmark. The company will be given a score of 1 if 
the board size is equal to or less than this average; otherwise, the score will be 0 
8 This item will be measured by calculating the average number of board meetings for all of the companies and considering this average as a benchmark. The company will 
be given a score of 1 if the number of board meetings is equal to or more than this average; otherwise, the score will be 0. 
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10. The chairman of the nomination committee is an independent non-
executive director. 
A.4.1 1/0 
 
11. All directors should have access to the advice and services of the company 
secretary. 
A.5.3 1/0 
 
12. New directors should receive a full, formal and tailored induction on 
joining the board. 
A.5.1 1/0 
 
13. Non-executive directors, have access to independent professional advice at 
the company’s expense. 
A.5.2 1/0 
 
14. All directors should be submitted for re-election at regular intervals. A.7.1 1/0 
 
 
15. There should be an insurance cover for legal action against directors. A.1.5 1/0 
 
Compensation 
Index (CI) 
16. The company has a remuneration committee. B.2.1 1/0 
 
17. All members of the remuneration committee are independent non-
executive directors. 
B.2.1 1/0 
 
18. Remuneration for non-executive directors should not include share options. B.1.3 1/0 
 
Accountability and 
Audit Index (AAI) 
19. The company has an audit committee. C.3.1 
 
1/0 
20. All members of the audit committee should be independent non-executive 
directors. 
 C.3.1 1/0 
 
21. At least one member of the audit committee should have financial 
expertise. 
C.3.1 1/0 
 
22. The board should, at least annually, conduct a review of the effectiveness C.2.1 1/0 
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of the internal control system.  
23. There should be a board statement on the going-concern status of the firm.  C.1.2 1/0 
 
 Relations with 
Shareholders Index 
(RSI) 
 
24. Chairmen of the audit, remuneration and nomination committees should be 
available to answer questions at the AGM, and all directors should also 
attend. 
D.2.3 
 
 
 
1/0 
 
 
 
25. Steps taken to ensure that the members of the board develop an 
understanding of the views of major shareholders should be disclosed in 
the annual report. 
D.1.2 1/0 
26. Notice of the AGM and related papers to be sent to shareholders at least 20 
working days before the meeting. 
D.2.4 1/0 
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TABLES  
Table (1) Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table provides the descriptive statistics for the dependent (major shareholders), independent (total CG index and all sub-indices) and control variables 
for each year as well as for the whole period (2005-2009), pre-financial crisis period (2005–2007) and during financial crisis period (2008–2009), 
respectively. Where TOTAL_MAJ is the percentage of shares owned by shareholders with at least 3% of the company shares; MAJ1 is the percentage of 
shares owned by pension funds and insurance companies with at least 3% of the company shares; MAJ2 is the percentage of shares owned by other 
institutional investors with at least 3% of the company shares; MAJ3 is the percentage of shares owned by corporations with at least 3% of the company 
shares; MAJ4 is the percentage of shares owned by states, governmental agencies, governmental departments or local authorities with at least 3% of the 
company shares; MAJ5 is the percentage of shares owned by shareholders who are closely tied to the firm, such as managers and directors; MAJ6 is the 
percentage of shares owned by  other families and individuals who are outsiders;  MAJ7 is the percentage of shares owned by others), such as foundations or 
research institutes; CG_SCORE is the total CG score; BCII is the score of board composition and independence index; BPPI is the score of board process 
and practice index;  CI is the score of compensation index; AAI is the score of accountability and audit index; RSI is the score of relations with shareholders; 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV is the percentage of total debt to total assets; TURN is the annual share volume over the year to shares 
outstanding; DIVIDEND is dividends per share to market price-year end * 100; PRICE is the annual average stock price;  ROA is the percentage of net 
income to total assets; TQ is market value of equity plus total debts to total assets. RETURN is the annual (end-of-year) geometric stock rate of return. 
 
Variables Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
( 2005) 
Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
(2006) 
Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
(2007) 
Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
( 2008) 
 Mean 
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2009) 
Mean  
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2005 to 2007) 
Mean  
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
(2008 to 2009) 
Mean  
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2005 to 2009) 
TOTAL_MAJ 32.32 
(29.8) 
(16.78) 
32.56 
(30.88) 
( 17.02) 
36.49 
(34.73) 
(17.10) 
38.26 
(37.4) 
(18.45) 
38.17 
(37.1) 
(17.08) 
33.81 
( 31.58) 
(17.04) 
38.21 
(37.25) 
(17.75) 
35.56 
(33.76) 
(17.45) 
MAJ1 4.09 
(3.19) 
(5.52) 
4.25 
  ( 3.3) 
(5.28) 
7.01 
(4.81) 
(6.44) 
7.05 
(4.69) 
(6.10) 
7.17 
(4.49) 
(6.29) 
5.12 
 ( 3.58) 
(5.91) 
7.11 
(4.55) 
(6.18) 
5.91 
( 4) 
(6.09) 
MAJ2 19.67 
(18.26) 
(13.23) 
20.45 
(17.7) 
(14.06) 
21.31 
(19.22) 
(14.06) 
21.86 
(20.55) 
(15.29) 
22.17 
(19.97) 
(14.97) 
20.48 
(18.27) 
(13.77) 
22.01 
(20.2) 
(15.11) 
21.09 
(18.91) 
(14.33) 
MAJ3 5.22 
(0 ) 
(13.37) 
4.66 
(0 ) 
(12.45) 
4.86 
(0)  
(12.72) 
5.611 
(0)  
(13.51) 
5.80 
(0) 
(13.65) 
4.91 
(0) 
(12.82) 
5.70 
(0) 
(13.56) 
5.23 
(0) 
(13.12) 
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Table (1) Continued  
Variables Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
( 2005) 
Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
(2006) 
Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
(2007) 
Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
( 2008) 
 Mean 
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2009) 
Mean  
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2005 to 2007) 
Mean  
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
(2008 to 2009) 
Mean  
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2005 to 2009) 
MAJ4 0 
(0) 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
(0) 
.0359 
(0) 
(.4240) 
.1079 
(0) 
(1.272) 
.1079 
(0) 
(1.27) 
.0119 
(0) 
(.2448) 
.1079 
(0) 
(1.26) 
.0503 
(0) 
(.8257) 
MAJ5 1.94 
(0) 
(7.37) 
1.85 
(0) 
(7.36) 
2.01 
(0) 
(7.43) 
1.97 
(0) 
(7.35) 
1.90 
(0) 
(7.00) 
1.940 
   (0) 
(7.37) 
1.942 
(0) 
(7.16) 
1.94 
(0) 
(7.28) 
MAJ6 .2512 
(0) 
(1.26) 
.1844 
(0) 
(1.29) 
.1491 
(0) 
(1.026) 
.2953 
(0) 
(1.56) 
.1626 
(0) 
(1.17) 
.1949 
(0) 
(1.20) 
.2290 
(0) 
(1.38) 
.2085 
(0) 
(1.275) 
MAJ7 1.13 
(0) 
(5.47) 
1.17 
(0) 
(5.56) 
1.12 
(0) 
(5.84) 
1.36 
(0) 
(6.32) 
.8638 
(0) 
(5.48) 
1.14 
(0) 
(5.61) 
1.11 
(0) 
(5.91) 
1.133 
(0) 
(5.73) 
CG_SCORE 
 
.8140  
(.8461) 
(.0956) 
.8231  
(.8461) 
(.0945) 
.8367  
(.8461) 
(.0884) 
.8489  
(.8461) 
(.0831) 
.8569  
(.8846) 
(.0823) 
 
.8246  
(.8461) 
(.0931) 
.8529  
(.8846) 
(.0826) 
.8359  
(.8461) 
(.0901) 
BCII .6825  
(.75) 
(.1832) 
.6933  
(.75) 
(.1868) 
.7167  
(.75) 
(.1809) 
.7302 
 (.75) 
(.1730) 
. 7464 
(.75) 
(.1715) 
.6975  
(.75) 
(.1838) 
.7383  
(.75) 
(.1721) 
.7138  
(.75  ) 
(.1802) 
BPPI .9125  
(1) 
(.1293) 
.9136  
(1) 
(.1339) 
.9187  
(1) 
(.1344) 
.9351  
(1) 
(.1091) 
.9321  
(1) 
(.1133) 
.9149  
(1) 
(.1323) 
.9336  
(1) 
(.1110) 
.9224  
(1) 
(.124) 
CI .9329 
(1) 
(.1399) 
.9472 
(1) 
(.1284) 
.9592 
(1) 
(.1094) 
.9616 
(1) 
(.1139) 
.9640 
(1) 
(.1112) 
.9464 
(1) 
(.1267) 
.9628 
(1) 
(.1124) 
.9530 
(1) 
(.121) 
AAI .9366  
(1) 
(.1130) 
.9553  
(1) 
(.0964) 
.9582  
(1) 
(.0916) 
.9669 
(1) 
(.0819) 
.9712 
 (1) 
(.0782) 
.9501 
(1) 
(.1009) 
.9690  
(1) 
(.0800) 
.9576  
(1) 
(.0935) 
RSI .6115 
(.667) 
(.2526) 
.6139 
(.667) 
(.2516) 
.6403 
(.667) 
(.2541) 
.6546 
(.667) 
(.2614) 
.6787 
(.667) 
(.2520) 
.6219 
(.667) 
(.2525) 
.6667 
(.667) 
(.2566) 
.6398 
(.667) 
(.2549) 
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Table (1) Continued  
Variables Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
( 2005) 
Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
(2006) 
Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
(2007) 
Mean 
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
( 2008) 
 Mean 
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2009) 
Mean  
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2005 to 2007) 
Mean  
(Median) 
(Std. Dev.) 
(2008 to 2009) 
Mean  
(Median)  
(Std. Dev.) 
(2005 to 2009) 
SIZE 21.41 
(21.22) 
(1.377) 
21.61 
(21.46) 
(1.406) 
21.62 
(21.46) 
(1.409) 
21.16 
(21.06) 
(1.407) 
21.27 
(21.10) 
(1.384) 
21.55 
(21.38) 
(1.397) 
21.21 
(  21.07) 
(1.394) 
21.41 
(  21.25) 
(1.404) 
LEV 0.2470 
(.2312) 
(.1640) 
0.2629 
(.2438) 
(.1681) 
0.2485 
(.2311) 
(.1657) 
0.2369 
(.2192) 
(.1749) 
0.2366 
(.2125) 
(.1657) 
0.2528 
(.2336) 
(.1657) 
0.2368 
(.2190) 
(.1700) 
0.2463 
(0.230) 
(.1675) 
TURN 2.17 
(1.61) 
(2.67) 
2.12 
(1.75) 
(2.23) 
2.45 
(1.82) 
(3.78) 
2.46 
(1.85) 
(2.85) 
1.90 
(1.44) 
(1.87) 
2.25 
(1.68) 
(2.97) 
2.18 
(1.65) 
(2.42) 
2.22 
(1.66) 
(2.76) 
DIVIDEND 2.47 
(2.46) 
(1.44) 
2.38 
(2.41) 
(1.43) 
2.08 
(2.05) 
(1.19) 
3.41 
(2.91) 
(2.90) 
3.77 
(3.39) 
(3.55) 
2.31 
( 2.28) 
(1.36) 
3.59 
(3.075) 
(3.24) 
2.82 
(2.54) 
(2.39) 
PRICE 5.148  
(3.8 ) 
(5.356) 
6.533 
(4.335) 
(6.391) 
8.378 
(6.28) 
(7.611) 
728.97 
(475.37) 
(739.44) 
5.665 
(3.533) 
(6.044) 
6.701 
(4.702) 
(6.645) 
6.477 
(4.161) 
(6.789) 
6.611  
(4.507) 
(6.700) 
ROA .1024 
(.0751) 
(.1013) 
.0670 
(.058) 
(.1104) 
.0513 
(.0482) 
(.0930) 
.0804 
(.0691) 
(.0726) 
.0933 
(.0752) 
(.0755) 
.0736 
(.060) 
(.1038) 
.0868 
(.0715) 
(.0742) 
.07895 
(.067) 
(.0932) 
TQ 1.79 
(1.50) 
(.9327) 
1.42 
(1.24) 
(1.208) 
1.15 
(0.99) 
(.6910) 
1.48 
(1.16) 
(.9593) 
1.67 
(1.34) 
(1.078) 
1.45 
(1.23) 
(.9994) 
1.57 
( 1.26) 
(1.022) 
1.50 
(1.24) 
(1.00) 
RETURN .1708 
(.1988) 
(.2281) 
.2840  
(.1988) 
(.2519) 
.2128  
(.2114) 
(.1920) 
-.1191  
(-.0805) 
(.3526) 
-.5253  
(-.3770) 
(.5595) 
.2227  
(.2265) 
(.2259) 
-.32228 
(-.2380) 
(.5092) 
.0008  
(.0976) 
(.4553) 
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Table (2): Pearson’s Correlation Matrix 
 
This table presents the Pearson’s correlation matrix for the main variables used in our analysis. Where BCII is the score of board composition and 
independence index; BPPI is the score of board process and practice index;  CI is the score of compensation index; AAI is the score of accountability and 
audit index; RSI is the score of relations with shareholders; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV is the percentage of total debt to total assets; 
TURN is the annual share volume over the year to shares outstanding; DIVIDEND is dividends per share to market price-year end * 100; PRICE is the 
annual average stock price;  ROA is the percentage of net income to total assets; TQ is market value of equity plus total debts to total assets. RETURN is the 
annual (end-of-year) geometric stock rate of return. 
Variables  BCII BPPI CI AAI RSI SIZE LEV TURN DIVIDEND PRICE ROA TQ RETURN 
BCII 1.0000             
BPPI 0.2007*** 1.0000            
CI 0.1442*** 0.1087*** 1.0000           
AAI 0.2089*** 0.1928*** 0.4504*** 1.0000          
RSI 0.0990*** 0.0421 -0.0398  0.1045*** 1.0000         
SIZE 0.0170  0.0123  -0.0273  0.0799** 0.0603 1.0000        
LEV 0.1769*** -0.0068  0.0206 0.0405  0.0728* 0.2634 *** 1.0000       
TURN 0.1954*** 0.1097 0.0754** 0.1889*** -0.0286 0.0847** 0.1304*** 1.0000      
DIVIDEND 0.1203*** 0.0189  0.0738*  0.1321*** 0.1260*** 0.1019 *** 0.2469*** -0.1351*** 1.0000     
PRICE -0.0469 -0.0723* 0.0741* 0.0015 -0.0006 0.2217*** -0.0979** -0.1362*** -0.1706*** 1.0000    
ROA -0.0778 ** -0.0518 0.0187 -0.0783** -0.0443  -0.2416*** -0.2706*** -0.0810** -0.0920** 0.2950*** 1.0000   
TQ -0.0831** -0.0192 0.0158 -0.0673* -0.0114 -0.4253*** -0.0808** -0.0090 -0.2545*** 0.2739*** 0.6026*** 1.0000  
RETURN -0.1493*** -0.0402 -0.0287 -0.1188*** -0.0646* -0.0908** -0.134*** -0.0390 -0.4004*** 0.2983*** 0.3202*** 0.3512*** 1.0000 
*** Significant at 0.01 level    ** Significant at 0.05 level    * Significant at 0.1 level 
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Table (3): Pearson’s Correlation Matrix 
This table presents the Pearson’s correlation matrix for the main variables used in our analysis. Where CG_SCORE is the total CG score; SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets; LEV is the percentage of total debt to total assets; TURN is the annual share volume over the year to shares outstanding; 
DIVIDEND is dividends per share to market price-year end * 100; PRICE is the annual average stock price; ROA is the percentage of net income to total 
assets; TQ is market value of equity plus total debts to total assets; RETURN is the annual (end-of-year) geometric stock rate of return. 
 
Variables CG SCORE SIZE LEV TURN DIVIDEND PRICE ROA TQ RETURN 
CG_SCORE 1.0000         
SIZE 0.0310 1.0000        
LEV 0.1376*** 0.2634 *** 1.0000       
TURN 0.1586*** 0.0847** 0.1304*** 1.0000      
DIVIDEND 0.1745*** 0.1019 *** 0.2469*** -0.1351*** 1.0000     
PRICE -0.0718 0.2217*** -0.0979** -0.1362*** -0.1706*** 1.0000    
ROA -0.1118 *** -0.2416*** -0.2706*** -0.0810** -0.0920** 0.2950*** 1.0000   
TQ -0.1091***  -0.4253*** -0.0808** -0.0090 -0.2545*** 0.2739*** 0.6026*** 1.0000  
RETURN -0.1601***   -0.0908** -0.134*** -0.0390 -0.4004*** 0.2983*** 0.3202*** 0.3512*** 1.0000 
*** Significant at 0.01 level    ** Significant at 0.05 level    * Significant at 0.1 level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Page 43 of 52
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jaaf
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 44 
Table (4) Regression Results of Corporate Governance Score and Total Major Shareholdings 
This table presents the regression results of total major shareholdings and corporate governance score. In Model (1) we examine the impact of previous 
year’s CG score on major shareholdings; in model (2) we examine previous year’s changes in CG and its impact on changes of major shareholdings and 
other control variables. Where ∆ denotes change in the variable; TOTAL_MAJ is the percentage of shares owned by shareholders with at least 3% of the 
company shares; CG_SCORE is the total CG score; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV is the percentage of total debt to total assets; TURN is 
the annual share volume over the year to shares outstanding; DIVIDEND is dividends per share to market price-year end * 100; PRICE is the annual average 
stock price; ROA is the percentage of net income to total assets; TQ is market value of equity plus total debts to total assets. RETURN is the annual (end-of-
year) geometric stock rate of return. These models provide t-statistics or z-statistics which are in parentheses depends on the used regression fixed effect or 
random effect respectively. 
 
Variables TOTAL_MAJ /Model1 Variables ∆TOTAL_MAJ /Model2 
intercept 1.28 (16.80) *** intercept .0225 (1.35)  
LAG (CG_SCORE) .1012 ( 1.85) * LAG(∆CG SCORE) .0994(1.39)  
SIZE -.0004(-0.01)  ∆ SIZE -.1117(-1.04) 
LEV .0547 (2.89) * ∆LEV  .0620(1.97) ** 
TURN .0443(1.86) * ∆TURN .0483 (2.53) ** 
DIVIDEND -.0010 (-0.05) ∆DIVIDEND .0242 (1.08)  
PRICE -.0230 (-0.45) ∆PRICE  .1015 (1.58) 
ROA -.0108 (-0.66) ∆ROA .0055 (0.37) 
TQ .0043 (0.10) ∆TQ -.0613(-1.19) 
RETURN -.0547(-3.29)*** ∆RETURN -.0400 (-2.63) *** 
 
R2 0.0976 R2 0.0655 
Observations 
Groups 
556 
139 
Observations 
Groups 
417 
139 
 Hausman test/ Prob > chi
2
 0.000 Hausman test/ Prob > chi
2
 0.2045 
 
 *** Significant at 0.01 level    ** Significant at 0.05level    * Significant at 0.1 level 
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Table (5) Regression Results of Corporate Governance sub -Indices and Total Major Shareholdings 
This table presents the regression results of total major shareholdings and corporate governance sub-indices. In Model 1, we examine the impact of previous 
year’s CG sub-indices on major shareholding, in model 2 we examine previous year’s changes in CG sub-indices impact on changes of major shareholding. 
Where ∆ denotes change in the variable, Where ∆ denotes change in the variable; TOTAL_MAJ is the percentage of shares owned by shareholders with at 
least 3% of the company shares; BCII is the score of board composition and independence index; BPPI is the score of board process and practice index;  CI 
is the score of compensation index; AAI is the score of accountability and audit index; RSI is the score of relations with shareholders; SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets; LEV is the percentage of total debt to total assets; TURN is the annual share volume over the year to shares outstanding; 
DIVIDEND is dividends per share to market price-year end * 100; PRICE is the annual average stock price; ROA is the percentage of net income to total 
assets; TQ is market value of equity plus total debts to total assets. RETURN is the annual (end-of-year) geometric stock rate of return. These models 
provide t-statistics or z-statistics which are in parentheses depends on the used regression fixed effect or random effect respectively. These models provide t-
statistics or z-statistics (in parentheses) depending on the used regression fixed effect or random effect respectively. 
 
 Variables TOTAL_MAJ /Model1 Variables ∆ TOTAL_MAJ /Model2 
intercept 1.43(239.33) *** intercept .0228 (1.30)  
LAG(BCII) .0623 (2.27) ** LAG(∆ BCII) .0469 (1.63)  
LAG (BPPI) -.0267 (-0.97) LAG (∆ BPPI) -.0202 (-0.57) 
LAG (CI) -.0318 (-0.96) LAG (∆ CI) -.0555 (-1.35) 
LAG (AAI) .0270 (0.73) LAG (∆ AAI) .0374 (1.06) 
LAG (RSI) -.0094 (-0.28) LAG (∆ RSI) .0287 (0.71) 
SIZE   -.0255(-0.30) ∆ SIZE -.1444 (-1.35) 
LEV .0574 (1.84) * ∆ LEV .0662 (2.04)** 
TURN .0399 (1.65)  ∆ TURN . 0454 (2.36) ** 
DIVIDEND -.0022(-0.11) ∆ DIVIDEND .0225 (1.05)  
PRICE -.0009 (-0.02) ∆ PRICE .1187 (1.87) * 
ROA -.0117 (-0.71) ∆ ROA .0049 (0.32) 
TQ -.0102 (-0.24) ∆ TQ -.0729 (-1.46) 
RETURN -.0579 (-3.33) *** ∆ RETURN -.0440 (-2.80) *** 
R
2
 0.1461 R
2
 0.0779 
Observations 556 Observations 417 
Groups 139 Groups 139 
Hausman test/prob> chi2 0.0000 Hausman test/prob> chi2 0.4673 
   *** Significant at 0.01 level    ** Significant at 0.05level    * Significant at 0.1 level 
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Table (6) Regression Results of the Relation between Corporate Governance Score and Total Major Shareholdings Pre and during the 
Financial Crisis 
 
This table presents the regression results of total major shareholdings and corporate governance score pre and during the financial crisis. We examine 
previous year’s CG impact on major shareholdings pre and during the financial crisis. where TOTAL_MAJ is the percentage of shares owned by 
shareholders with at least 3% of the company shares; CG_SCORE is the total CG score; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV is the percentage 
of total debt to total assets; TURN is the annual share volume over the year to shares outstanding; DIVIDEND is dividends per share to market price-year 
end * 100; PRICE is the annual average stock price; ROA is the percentage of net income to total assets; TQ is market value of equity plus total debts to total 
assets. RETURN is the annual (end-of-year) geometric stock rate of return. These models provide t-statistics which are in parentheses. 
 
Variables Pre- crisis During-crisis 
intercept 1.20 (10.96) *** 1.14 (6.68) *** 
LAG(CG_SCORE) .1274 (1.56) .2198 (1.84)* 
SIZE -.2071 (-1.03) -.2970 (-0.96) 
LEV .0831 (1.80)* .1201(1.68) * 
TURN -.0142 (-0.43) .0586 (2.51) ** 
DIVIDEND -.2164 (-2.39) ** .0364 (1.40) 
PRICE .3310 (1.82)* .1574 (1.68)* 
ROA -.0119(-0.67) -.0095 (-0.43) 
TQ -.2777 (-2.28) ** -.1700 (-1.67)* 
RETURN  -.0455 (-2.15)** -.0086(-0.30)  
 
R
2
 0.2068 0.1356 
Observations 278 278 
Groups 139 139 
Hausman test/prob> chi2 0.0000 0.0001 
 
     *** Significant at 0.01 level    ** Significant at 0.05 level    * Significant at 0.1 level 
 
 
  
Page 46 of 52
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jaaf
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 47 
Table (7) Regression Results of the Relation between Corporate Governance sub -Indices and Total Major Shareholdings Pre and 
during the Financial Crisis 
This table presents the regression results of total major shareholdings on corporate governance sub-indices. We examine previous year’s CG sub-indices 
impact on major shareholdings pre and during the financial crisis.  Where TOTAL_MAJ is the percentage of shares owned by shareholders with at least 3% 
of the company shares; BCII is the score of board composition and independence index; BPPI is the score of board process and practice index;  CI is the 
score of compensation index; AAI is the score of accountability and audit index; RSI is the score of relations with shareholders; SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets; LEV is the percentage of total debt to total assets; TURN is the annual share volume over the year to shares outstanding; 
DIVIDEND is dividends per share to market price-year end * 100; PRICE is the annual average stock price; ROA is the percentage of net income to total 
assets; TQ is market value of equity plus total debts to total assets. RETURN is the annual (end-of-year) geometric stock rate of return. These models 
provide t-statistics which are in parentheses.  
 
Variables Pre- crisis During-crisis 
intercept 1.39 (58.26) *** 1.46 (33.67)*** 
LAG(BCII) .0403 (1.12) .1116 (2.07) ** 
LAG (BPPI) -.0269 (-0.66) .0691 (1.00) 
LAG (CI) .0125 (0.25)  -.1762(-1.47) 
LAG (AAI) .0439 (1.00) .0020 (0.03) 
LAG (RSI) .0876 (1.01) .0058 (0.13) 
SIZE -.2260 (-0.99) -.3248 (-1.22) 
LEV .0751 (1.57)  .0754(1.23) 
TURN -.0167 (-0.54) .0655(2.78)*** 
DIVIDEND -.2132 (-2.33)** .0443(1.72) * 
PRICE .3474 (1.67)*  .1560 (1.67)* 
ROA -.0120(-0.56) .0023 (0.11) 
TQ -.2957 (-2.06)** -.1505(-1.52)  
RETURN -.0416 (-1.96)* -.0200 (-0.72) 
 
R2 0.2253 0.1874 
Observations 278 278 
Groups 139 139 
Hausman test/ Prob > chi
2
 0.0000 0.0164 
 
      *** Significant at 0.01 level    ** Significant at 0.05 level    * Significant at 0.1 level 
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Table (8) Regression Results of Corporate Governance Score and Types of Major Shareholdings 
This table presents the regression results of each type of total major shareholdings and previous year’s corporate governance score. Each column represent 
different type of major shareholders starting with column1 which represent the regression result on MAJ1, Where MAJ1 is the percentage of shares owned 
by pension funds and insurance companies with at least 3% of the company shares; MAJ2 is the percentage of shares owned by other institutional investors 
with at least 3% of the company shares; MAJ3 is the percentage of shares owned by corporations with at least 3% of the company shares;. MAJ4 is the 
percentage of shares owned by states, governmental agencies, governmental departments or local authorities with at least 3% of the company shares. MAJ5 
is the percentage of shares owned by shareholders who are closely tied to the firm, such as managers and directors; MAJ6 is the percentage of shares owned 
by  other families and individuals who are outsiders;  MAJ7 is the percentage of shares owned by others, such as foundations or research institutes; 
CG_SCORE is the total CG score; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV is the percentage of total debt to total assets; TURN is the annual share 
volume over the year to shares outstanding; DIVIDEND is dividends per share to market price-year end * 100; PRICE is the annual average stock price; 
ROA is the percentage of net income to total assets; TQ is market value of equity plus total debts to total assets. RETURN is the annual (end-of-year) 
geometric stock rate of return.). These models provide t-statistics or z-statistics (in parentheses) depending on the used regression fixed effect or random 
effect respectively.  
 
Variables MAJ1 /Model 1 MAJ2 /Model2 MAJ3 /Model 3 MAJ4/Model4       MAJ5 /Model 5 MAJ6 /Model6 MAJ7 /Model7 
intercept -.2034 (-0.83) -.2079 (-1.29) .2096 (1.43) -.0966 (-1.27)  .0731(1.09) .0674 (1.08) -.0919 (-0.96) 
Lag(CG_SCORE) .1864 (1.07)  .1745(1.69) * -.0903 (-1.01) .0744(1.39) -.0129 (-0.28) -.0338(-1.00) .1060 (1.56) 
SIZE .5260(2.14) ** -.2588(-3.18)*** -.0552(-0.87) -.1143 (-1.14) .1085 (0.81) .0112 (0.28) -.2172(-1.38) 
LEV -.0344 (-0.38) .0825 (1.50) .0144(  0.34)  .0631 (1.23)  .0351(1.03) -.0078 (-0.36) .1518(2.25) ** 
TURN .1879 (3.40) *** .0087 (0.21) .0119 (0.42) .0157 (1.35) .0130(0.60) .0989 (1.79) * .0241(0.99) 
DIVIDEN .0417 (0.79) .0279 (0.66) -.0910(-2.43) ** -.0272 (-1.30)  .0028 (0.12) .0061 (0.32) .0308(1.06) 
PRICE .1541 (0.91) -.0725 (-1.06) -.0532(-1.08) .1097 (1.13) .0089 (0.11)  -.0338 (-1.05) .1081(0.72) 
ROA -.0049 (-0.12)  .0012 (0.03) -.0353 (-1.25) -.0085 (-0.83) -.0013 (-0.06)  -.0014 (-0.13) .0054(0.18) 
TQ .1186(0.90) .0110 (0.15) -.0763 (-1.46) -.0972 (-0.90) .0269(0.34) .0352 (1.34) -.1510(-1.33)  
RETURN -.1510(-4.03) *** -.0775(-2.37)** -.0339 (-1.41)  -.0073 (-0.75) .0018 (0.14)  -.0238 (-1.56)  .0651(2.01) ** 
 
R2 0.1184 0.1312 0.0319 0.0452 0.0186   0.0281 0.0548 
Observations 556 556 556 556 556 556 556 
Groups 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 
Hausman test/ Prob > chi
2
 0.000 0.5028 0.0826 0.0265 0.0003 0.1249 0.0474 
*** Significant at 0.01 level    ** Significant at 0.05 level    * Significant at 0.1 level 
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Table (9) Regression Results of Corporate Governance Score and Types of Major Shareholdings (Previous Year’s Change in CG) 
This table presents the regression result of the previous year’s change of CG_SCORE and the changes of each type of major shareholdings. Each column 
represent different type of major shareholdings starting with column1 which represent the regression result on MAJ1, Where ∆ denotes change in the 
variable; Maj1 is the percentage of shares owned by pension funds and insurance companies with at least 3% of the company shares; MAJ2 is the percentage 
of shares owned by other institutional investors with at least 3% of the company shares; MAJ3 is the percentage of shares owned by corporations with at 
least 3% of the company shares; MAJ4 is the percentage of shares owned by states, governmental agencies, governmental departments or local authorities 
with at least 3% of the company shares. MAJ5 is the percentage of shares owned by shareholders who are closely tied to the firm, such as managers and 
directors; MAJ6 is the percentage of shares owned by  other families and individuals who are outsiders; MAJ7 is the percentage of shares owned by others), 
such as foundations or research institutes; CG_SCORE is the total CG score; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV is the percentage of total debt 
to total assets; TURN is the annual share volume over the year to shares outstanding; DIVIDEND is dividends per share to market price-year end * 100; 
PRICE is the annual average stock price; ROA is the percentage of net income to total assets; TQ is market value of equity plus total debts to total assets. 
RETURN is the annual (end-of-year) geometric stock rate of return. These models provide t-statistics or z-statistics (in parentheses) depending on the used 
regression fixed effect or random effect respectively. 
Variables ∆ MAJ1/Model 1 ∆ MAJ2 /Model 2 ∆ MAJ3 /Model 3 ∆ MAJ4/Model 4 ∆ MAJ5 /Model 5 ∆ MAJ6 /Model 6 ∆ MAJ7 /Model 7 
Intercept .1605 (3.76)***   -.0095 (-0.23)  .0205(0.87) .0070(1.18) .0153 (0.78) -.0097(-0.67) -.0389 (-1.73)* 
LAG(∆ CG_SCORE) -.0353(-0.20) .2578( 2.06)** -.0911(-0.99) .0799(1.32) -.0193(-0.44) -.0294(-0.51) .0979 (1.20) 
∆ SIZE  .4365 (1.86)* -.2950(-1.24) -.1337(-0.79)  -.1603(-1.39) .0912(0.81)  -.0885(-1.38) -.0706 (-0.51) 
∆LEV -.0943(-0.96) .1107(1.46) .0015 (0.02)  .0653 (1.38) .0383(1.18) .0556(1.78)* .0961(2.01)** 
∆TURN .1693(2.67)*** -.0259 (-0.56) .0568 (1.86)* .0046(0.82) .0165 (0.63) .0199(0.47) .0269(0.96)  
∆DIVIDEND  .0394(0.64)  .0699(1.56) -.0705(-2.09)** -.0125(-1.26)  .0140(0.56)  .0142 (0.50) .0262 (0.98) 
∆PRICE .1322 (0.66)  .1772 (1.16) -.0520(-0.44)  .1111 (1.25) .0070 (0.11) .1105 (1.46) .0760 (0.54) 
∆ROA -.0253(-0.71) .0517(1.48) -.0114 (-0.36) -.0060(-1.05) -.0033(-0.10) -.0006 (-0.08) .0055 (0.17)  
∆TQ .2410(1.55) -.0971(-0.74) -.1305(-1.37) -.0659(-0.82) -.0071(-0.09) -.0658(-1.32) -.0952(-0.98) 
∆RETURN -.0568(-1.29) -.0867(-2.24) **  -.0095(-0.37)  -.0112(-0.81) .0322 (1.85)* -.0204(-1.08) .0133(0.48) 
 
R
2
 0.0639 0.0454 0.0587 0.0334   0.0284 0.0384   0.0229   
Observations 
Groups 
417 
139 
417 
139 
417 
139 
417 
139 
417 
139 
417 
139 
417 
139 
Hausman test/ Prob > chi
2
 0.9483 0.5276 0.8096 0.9973 0.9246 0.0088 0.9698 
 
*** Significant at 0.01 level    ** Significant at 0.05 level    * Significant at 0.1 level 
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Table (10) Regression Results of Corporate Governance sub-indices and Types of Major Shareholdings 
This table presents the regression result of the impact of previous year CG sub-indices on different types of major shareholdings;  and each column represent 
different type of major shareholders starting with column1 which represent the regression result on MAJ1. Where MAJ1 is the percentage of shares owned 
by pension funds and insurance companies with at least 3% of the company shares; MAJ2 is the percentage of shares owned by other institutional investors 
with at least 3% of the company shares; MAJ3 is the percentage of shares owned by corporations with at least 3% of the company shares;. MAJ4 is the 
percentage of shares owned by states, governmental agencies, governmental departments or local authorities with at least 3% of the company shares. MAJ5 
is the percentage of shares owned by shareholders who are closely tied to the firm, such as managers and directors; MAJ6 is the percentage of shares owned 
by  other families and individuals who are outsiders;  MAJ7 is the percentage of shares owned by others), such as foundations or research institutes; BPPI is 
the score of board process and practice index;  CI is the score of compensation index; AAI is the score of accountability and audit index; RSI is the score of 
relations with shareholders; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV is the percentage of total debt to total assets; TURN is the annual share volume 
over the year to shares outstanding; DIVIDEND is dividends per share to market price-year end * 100; PRICE is the annual average stock price; ROA is the 
percentage of net income to total assets; TQ is market value of equity plus total debts to total assets. RETURN is the annual (end-of-year) geometric stock 
rate of return. These models provide t-statistics or z-statistics (in parentheses) depending on the used regression fixed effect or random effect respectively. 
Variables MAJ1 /Model 1 MAJ2 /Model 2 MAJ3 /Model 3 MAJ4/Model 4 MAJ5 /Model 5 MAJ6 /Model 6 MAJ7 /Model 7 
intercept .0961 (6.42) *** .0327 (0.48) .0698(1.27) .0116(5.42) *** .0578 (8.33) *** .0143 (0.57) .0607(1.51) 
Lag(BCII) .0163 (0.22) .1299(2.31) ** -.0576(-1.57) .0069(0.39) .0072 (0.27) -.0053(-0.43) -.0354 (-1.19) 
Lag(BPPI) .0656(0.78) -.0392(-0.69) -.0190(-0.44) .0148(0.93) -.0012 (-0.08) -.0184(-0.86) .0285(0.80) 
Lag(CI) -.0366(-0.41) -.0364(-0.41) -.0304(-0.78) -.0030(-0.41) .0198( 0.72) -.0374(-0.61) .0292(0.64) 
Lag(AAI) .3342 (3.61) *** --.0386 (-0.50) -.0501(-1.28) -.0067(-0.69) .0269 (0.82) -.0068 (-0.21) .0230(0.74) 
Lag(RSI) -.0586(-0.47) -.0638(-0.93) .0004( 0.01) .0937(1.09) -.0646(-0.98) .0047(0.16) .0567 (1.60) 
SIZE .4867 (2.00) ** -.2533(-2.80)*** -.0518(-0.80) -.1123(-1.24) .1039(0.77) .0100 (0.25) -.0750(-1.67)* 
LEV -.0367(-0.41) .0782(1.48) .0177(0.42) .0600(1.28) .0358(1.02) -.0063(-0.28) .0775(1.91) * 
TURN .1742 (3.08) *** .0037 (0.08) .0150(0.54) .0161(1.35) . 0127 (0.64) .0986(1.76)* .0327(1.42) 
DIVIDEND .0364(0.70) .0334( 0.73) -.0898(-2.43) ** -.0275 (-1.36) .0023(0.10) .0063 (0.34) .0006(  0.03) 
PRICE .1409(0.81) -.0623(-0.81) -.0475(-0.96) .0989 (1.20) .0134(0.17) -.0303(-1.02) .0447(1.01) 
ROA -.0021(-0.05) .0004(0.01) -.0366 (-1.27) -.0102(-0.88) .0003(0.02) -.0024(-0.21) -.0064(-0.23) 
TQ .1013 (0.77) .0110(0.15) -.0753(-1.43) -.0862 (-0.94) .0181(0.23) .0361(1.36) -.0807(-1.90)* 
RETURN -.1375 (-3.47)*** -.0840 (-2.13) ** -.0398(-1.61) -.0061 (-0.59) .00326(0.25) -.0263(-1.53) .0607(2.04) ** 
 
R2 0.1730 0.1360 0.0530 0.0688 0.0311 0.0313 0.0193 
Observations 556 556 556 556 556 556 556 
Groups 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 
Hausman test/ Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.5022 0.1104 0.0095 0.0000 0.2882 0.0998 
*** Significant at 0.01 level    ** Significant at 0.05 level    * Significant at 0.1 level 
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Table (11) Regression Results of Corporate Governance sub-indices and Types of Major Shareholdings (Previous Year’s Change in CG 
Sub-Indices  
This table presents the regression result of the impact of the previous year’s change of CG sub-indices on the changes of different types of major 
shareholdings;  and each column represent different type of major shareholders starting with column1 which represent the regression result on MAJ1. Where 
∆ denotes change in the variable; MAJ1 is the percentage of shares owned by pension funds and insurance companies with at least 3% of the company 
shares; MAJ2 is the percentage of shares owned by other institutional investors with at least 3% of the company shares; MAJ3 is the percentage of shares 
owned by corporations with at least 3% of the company shares;. MAJ4 is the percentage of shares owned by states, governmental agencies, governmental 
departments or local authorities with at least 3% of the company shares. MAJ5 is the percentage of shares owned by shareholders who are closely tied to the 
firm, such as managers and directors; MAJ6 is the percentage of shares owned by  other families and individuals who are outsiders;  MAJ7 is the percentage 
of shares owned by others), such as foundations or research institutes; BPPI is the score of board process and practice index;  CI is the score of compensation 
index; AAI is the score of accountability and audit index; RSI is the score of relations with shareholders; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV is 
the percentage of total debt to total assets; TURN is the annual share volume over the year to shares outstanding; DIVIDEND is dividends per share to 
market price-year end * 100; PRICE is the annual average stock price; ROA is the percentage of net income to total assets; TQ is market value of equity plus 
total debts to total assets. RETURN is the annual (end-of-year) geometric stock rate of return. These models provide t-statistics or z-statistics (in parentheses) 
depending on the used regression fixed effect or random effect respectively. 
Variables ∆ MAJ1 /Model 1 ∆ MAJ2 /Model 2 ∆ MAJ3 /Model 3 ∆MAJ4/Model4 ∆ MAJ5 /Model 5 ∆ MAJ6 /Model 6 ∆ MAJ7 /Model 7 
intercept  .1500 (3.42) *** -.0060(-0.17) .0262(1.09) .0064(1.09) .0142(0.74) -.0103(-0.67) -.0398 (-1.71)* 
LAG(∆ BCII) -.0706(-0.88) .1404(2.01)** -.0161(-0.48)   .0321(0.98) .0020(0.06) -.0372(-1.52) -.0051(-0.11) 
LAG(∆ BPPI) .0211(0.23) -.0373(-0.51) - .0911 (-1.50) -.0087(-0.96) . 0234 (1.48) .0268(1.61) .0764(1.48) 
LAG(∆ CI) -.0656(-0.94) -.0058(-0.07) -.0822 (-1.77) -.004 (-0.79) -.0119(-0.65) -.0820(-1.33)  .0275 (0.86) 
LAG(∆ AAI) .2628(2.81) *** -.0445(-0.51) -.0008(-0.02) .0053( 0.79) .0338(0.99) .0228(1.14)  .0040(0.31) 
LAG(∆ RSI) -.0648(-0.45) ..0449 (0.48) -.0232(-0.35) .0513(1.02) -.0903(-1.27) .0869(1.32)   .0484(1.45) 
∆ SIZE .4259(1.82)*  -.3380(-1.49) -.1707(-1.03) -.1691(-1.41) .0859(0.74) -.0995(-1.43) -.0504(-0.36) 
∆ LEV -.0810(-0.86) .1086 (1.65)  .0111 (0.18) .0646(1.39)  .0416 (1.25) .0551(1.92)*  .0878(1.91)* 
∆ TURN .1566(2.50) ** -.0272(-0.59) .0540(1.85)* .0045(0.81) .0135(0.60) .0256(0.63) .0293(1.02) 
∆ DIVIDEND .0351(0.57) .0684(1.46) -.0731(-2.15)** -.0141(-1.29) .0164(0.65) .0137(0.48) .0279(1.04) 
∆ PRICE   .1217(0.61) .2062(1.27) -.0281(-0.24) .1151(1.29) .0103(0.16) .1220 (1.54) .0608(0.43) 
∆ ROA  -.0243(-0.67) .0505(1.37) -.0115(-0.36) -.0077(-1.05) .00007(0.00) -.0024(-0.25) .0050(0.16)  
∆ TQ .2381(1.59)  -.1149(-0.98)  -.1496(-1.59) -.0680(-0.88) -.0108(-0.14) -.0689(-1.51) -.0799(-0.82) 
∆ RETURN -.0586(-1.31) -.0915(-2.10) ** -.0136 (-0.52) -.0118(-0.77) .0301(1.73)* -.0217(-1.15) .0159(0.58) 
 
R
2
 0.0921 0.0519 0.0774 0.0385   0.0465 0.0855   00.0310 
Observations 417 417 417 417 417 417 417 
Groups 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 
Hausman test/ Prob > 
chi2 
0.9959 0.7744 0.7174 0.9977 0.9746 0.0101   0.9053 
*** Significant at 0.01 level    ** Significant at 0.05 level    * Significant at 0.1 level 
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Table (12) Results of Robustness Checks 
Table (12) presents the results of robustness checks. Model 1 gives the fixed effect regression results when we 
add the FREE_FLOAT which is the proportion of total equity that is not controlled by major holders as an 
additional independent variable. Model 2 give the random effect regression analysis when we add industry 
dummy variables to the regression between MAJ1 and CG. Model 3 gives the random effect regression results 
when we run the change regression in the reverse direction by using the change in MAJ2 as the explanatory 
variable and the change in CG as the dependent variable. All variables fully defined in Table (1). These models 
provide t-statistics or z-statistics (in parentheses) depending on the used regression fixed effect or random effect 
respectively. 
 
Variables TOTAL_MAJ /Model 1 MAJ1 /Model 2 Variables ∆ CG SCORE /Model 3 
Intercept 1.29(18.02) *** -.7432(-3.91)*** intercept .0470(3.31) *** 
Lag(CG_SCORE) .0990(1.94) * .2053 (1.86)                     Lag(∆ CG_SCORE)  
Lag (∆ MAJ2)   Lag (∆ MAJ2) .0081 (0.42) 
SIZE .0097(0.12)  .0173 (0.23) ∆ SIZE .1437 (1.64)  
LEV .0491(1.64)  .0427(0.69) ∆ LEV .0098(0.31) 
TURN .0398 (1.74)*  .1967(4.54) *** ∆ TURN .0039(0.16) 
DIVIDEND .00005(0.00) .0516(1.20) ∆ DIVIDEND -.0007(-0.03) 
PRICE -.0197(-0.42) .15272.10) ** ∆ PRICE -.0939(-1.54) 
ROA -.0072 (-0.46) -.0148(-0.36) ∆ ROA -.0006(-0.04) 
TQ .0059(0.15) .0040 (0.07)  ∆ TQ .0272(0.51  ) 
FREE_FLOAT -.0814(-3.36) *** NA ∆ FREE_FLOAT  
RETURN -.0565(-3.57) *** -.1509(-4.42) *** ∆ RETURN .0194(1.44) 
Industry dummy  YES Industry dummy  
 
R
2
 0.1696   0.1356 R
2
 0.0157 
Observations 
Groups 
556 
139 
556 
139 
Observations 
Groups 
417 
139 
Hausman test 
Prob > chi
2
 
 
0.0000 
 
 
Hausman test 
Prob > chi
2
 
 
0.9001 
*** Significant at 0.01 level    ** Significant at 0.05 level    * Significant at 0.1 level 
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